Constructing Supranational Security Interests in a Wider Europe

By Tiago Marques

" *The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States (…)"* – Article I-43 (Solidarity Clause), Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Brussels (2004)

11/9 or the other "9/11"

The post Cold War era heralded a new context for the production of a threefold myriad of meaningful speech acts on security, democracy and political institutionalisation. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the peaceful demise of the Soviet Union changed, in many different ways, the input/output processes between states and its representatives and the "international security market". It also brought new challenges to the international order, as rock-engraved beliefs over sovereignty and territoriality were put to test – see the Gulf War, the US intervention in Somalia, the Balkan Wars and the military operation in Iraq – through a somewhat more "muscled" approach to foreign policy by global and regional hegemons alike.

Europe was no exception to such trends. Indeed, its apparent self-inflicted insulation from the higer politics of the international system from the late 1940's to 1989 was – or, in fact, *had* to be – compatible with the construction of an established core community based on a different power, rotating on a civilian-economic axis. The end of the Cold War allowed Europe to complete the transition from its troubled Hobbesian past i.e. the first-half of the twentieth century, into a more consolidated Lockean picture. A decade and a half later, is the EU at a crossroads in the definition of its strategic role in the international arena? This article will seek to make a brief analytical overview of some of the most important steps taken by the European Union and its actors on the path toward the construction of a supranational polity able to take responsabilty for the gradual collectivisation of its external action tools, namely on decision-making processes and security matters. It will beg the question on whether the ESS constitutes a step forward in the creation of a new "epistemic community" based on a Kantian culture of co-operative and mutual reinforcing socio-political enhancement. Alternatively, it will assess if the ESS and the supranational European "entity" are merely a means to socialise and coherently consolidate a "collective we*ness* of self-esteem" bringing together its new member states and their peripheries.

From Key Largo to Nice

Diplomacy and defence have been giving new meaning since the original 11/9 (that is, the fall of the Berlin Wall), most specifically in the then new European context. The new beginning for the EU and its military and foreign affairs policies might be traced to an underrated event that took place in Florida in the spring of 1990. At Key Largo, French President François Mitterrand met its North American counterpart, George Bush, in a discreet summit that marked an embryo attempt to subtly and gradually decouple Europe's dependence from Washington's diplomatic and military "umbrella". There was of course the traditional love/hate story between Paris and NATO that needed to be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, this "dialogue of the deaf"[1] between Mitterrand and Bush included a specific and most important caveat, namely the fact that the position taken by the Elysée had been strictly co-ordinated with Bonn. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was a willing *partenaire* to the mini-concert between both European partners on pushing through for political union via the development of a common foreign and security policy[2]. Thus, EU demands to the US andNATO were less ambiguous in both scope and character than one might expect: Europe would gradually take on responsibility for collective security in the continent and its *near-abroad*, and there would be a new EU-US dialogue inside NATO about "ultimate strategic and *political* objectives leading to a subsequent debate about military and *institutional* restructuring"[3]. The construction of a progressively independent European foreign and security policy seemed to go on as an agreement between Washington and Brussels. A Paris-Berlin axis keen on enmesh national foreign policy interests was conceivably less a taboo than a political and historical motivated *personal* decision.

Maastricht consolidates the *perspective* of a common defence policy, by establishing in a legally binding treaty the possibility of moving towards such goal, whereas five years later, in 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam duly embodied the EU with the responsibility for the Petersberg tasks i.e. crisis management/peace enforcement missions. The fact that Sweden and Finland – countries with a traditionally conservative position on institutional military engagement - played an important role in such negotiations[4] further proves the special role played by the progressive internalisation of EU norms both within the *whole* and its *units*. Yet

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[1] Howorth, Jolyon, "Ideas and Discourse in a Construction of a European Security and Defense Policy for the Twenty-first Century" *in* Moens A., Cohen L.J., Sens A.G. (eds.) *NATO and European Security – Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the age of Terrorism*, Praeger Pub., Westport (2003) p.40

[2] *Ibid*

[3] *Ibid*, pp.40-42

[4] De Schoutheete, Phillippe, *La Cohérence par la Défense – Une autre lecture de la PESD*, Cahiers de Chaillot 71, Paris (2004) p.16

all things being equal, that is not to say that there was a uniform pattern of behaviour taking place among the different members of the Union. In fact, fealty to NATO and the historically contingent transatlantic ties kept on playing its part for different EU members, especially in its south-western flank, with Italy being a case in point for many of a political entity keen on allowing the North Atlantic Organisation to "determine its foreign policy"[5] due to its traditional security ties with Washington.

The treaty of Amsterdam also represented a useful means to put some institutional meat in the bones of the CFSP, by conceding a position of High Representative for the latter within EU institutional ranks as a way to improve the co-ordination of European foreign policymaking[6]. Such step was followed by the December 2000 Nice European Council decision on the creation of an EU Rapid Reaction Force together with the establishment of a permanent Military Committee and Military Staff to "oversee future military operations"[7]. By now one could sense that all the ways would lead to *Rome* i.e. there would be less of a tunnel at the end of the light as many had in fact predicted, the CFSP had not only been given a face – Javier Solana, former NATO SG – but the entire project was in fact close to – at last – breaking even.

The Socialisation of Actor/States

"*This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions, but on values (…) We are witnessing the beginnings of a new doctrine of international community (…) No longer is our existence as states under threat. Now our actions are guided by a subtler blend of mutual self-interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In the end, values and interest merge."*[8] – Tony Blair, British PM, Speech at the Economic Club of Chicago, 22nd April 1999

Before proceeding to the main unit under analysis – the ESS – it is important to clarify what I mean by Actor/States and its socialisation processes. Actors are, in this case, state representative structures with the capability of producing speech acts that contribute to the definition of social kinds[9]. The former can exert its influence both at the domestic and international level, but it will constitutively affect both. Such speech acts will, in turn, help placing the actor – national bureaucracy, a head of government – in diverse representative positions at the micro and macro-level. It can ultimately have legitimate representation –

[5] Freedman, L., Menon,A. "Defence, States and Integration" *in* Howorth J., Menon A.(eds.) *The European Union and National Defence Policy*, Routledge, London (1997) p.157
[6] Jones, Seth G. "The European Union and the Security Dilemma", *Security Studies*, 12, no.3 (2003) p.114
[7] *Ibid*
[8] Moens A., Cohen L.J., Sens A.G. (2003) p.50

acceptance via acknowledgement – in both. Tony Blair's "our actions" can – and do – personify both the FCO (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and EU-CFSP. Ultimately, it can represent the "international community" - as he seems to hint in his American speech on the Kosovo intervention – or even a Wendtian "World State"[10].

Actors socialise in the global arena of world politics and, through their actions, "continually produce and reproduce conceptions of Self and Other, [therefore] such identities and interests are always in process"[11]. It is only through resilient interaction between formal actors that a cultural definition of the underlying context i.e. the aforementioned global arena, can be constructed, and shared beliefs on both identities and interests of Self and Other coherently framed[12]. The socialisation process between the political elite "have's" will, in the end, determine "who's who" in the bargaining process and consolidate the various layers of political density, both within states and in the international system.

Few observers would challenge the proposition that foreign policy today can purport to be insulated from its "competitive market", that is to say, the globalised world of international politics. In an EU context, it is ever more an amalgamated web of pluri-directional "wills" that long to be transmuted into actions, and in this case in particular, common practice. If the region is "rather a constellation of we's"[13], then the European project might, in the long run, succeed in becoming an additional layer of identification, even potentially prior – and this is maybe wishful thinking – to a concept of being *français*, *español* or *british. One will simply become european.* So is one witnessing the emergence of the "first truly post-modern international political form"?[14] If so – and maybe despite of it – will it mean discarding nation-state based foreign policy in favour of a common strategy on external action by a supranational entity?

Talking Europe

The Franco-British summit of Saint-Malo in December 1998 has been repeatedly heralded as the decisive turning point, possibly the coming of age, of an assertive political EU embryo. Tony Blair had "crossed the Rubicon", when together with Jacques Chirac, a call had been made for the establishment of a "capacity for *autonomous* action" for the Union i.e. it was time to negotiate a better deal with Washington via NATO. For many analysts, it reflected a

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[9] See for instance Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms and Decisions* (1989)
[10] Wendt, Alexander, *Why a World State is Inevitable: Teleology and the Logic of Anarchy*, University of Chicago, January 2003
[11] Wendt, Alexander, *Social Theory of International Politics*, CUP, Cambridge (1999) p.36
[12] *Ibid* pp.186-188
[13] Waever, Ole, "Insecurity, security and asecurity in the West European non-war community", *in* Adler, Emanuel, Barnett, Michael (eds.) *Security Communities*, CUP, Cambridge (1998) p.94
[14] Ruggie, John G., *Constructing the World Polity*, Routledge, London (1998) p.173

compromise. London conceded that Brussels might prove the key to further its influence in the world arena, thus partially abandoning its quasi-exclusive commitment to Washington in the international political and security spheres. Paris, on the other hand, would acknowledge that such "autonomous action" would be fully compatible with the respective obligations to NATO as the "foundation for collective defence"[15]. All things being equal, it nevertheless meant that the political *navette* between London, Paris and Brussels was fast becoming a tangible reality. Blair, via the Foreign Office bureaucratic apparatus, was becoming part of a "new international epistemic community"[16], the twist being that, before being "international", it was fundamentally "European" in both character and embodiment.

At the same time, Germany carried on the work done in the Normandy conference by pushing for the construction of "*credible* military capabilities" and the development of an EU Rapid Reaction Force in the wake of the EU mid-term Cologne summit of 1999[17]. Building from decades long Franco-German *rapprochement*, from the Elysée Treaty of 1963 to the close personal relationships between De Gaulle and Adenauer, Mitterrand and Kohl, the European project greatly benefited from l´entente *amicale* emanating from both powers. The early 1990's had been no exception, as a consolidation of the socialisation between both countries gained momentum from the very onset. Roland Dumas and Hans-Dietrich Genscher - France´s and Germany´s foreign ministers, respectively – promoted a closer political and security *union* in an EU context and the eventual incorporation of a military arm of the EU[18]. Competing "self-interests" in a European scale were – and seemingly are – given place to the construction of "regional European identity and interests[19]" as a consequence of decades of interaction between parties – diplomats, bureaucrats, leaders - while a social component beyond the elite level was quietly beginning to make the headlines – see the 1990's Maastricht referendums in France and Denmark as a case in point. It is a European story of *amour violent*[20], where national interest keeps on threatening to rear its head and promote a return to the basics of *realpolitik* – see the EU divide over Iraq 2003 as a case in point – while heterogeneous dynamics push forward with a treaty establishing a "Constitution for *Europe*".

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[15] Haine, Jean-Yves, "An historical perspective", *in* Gnesotto, Nicole (ed.) *EU Security and Defence Policy: the first five years (1999-2004)*, ISS-EU, Paris (2004) p.43
[16] Moens A., Cohen L.J., Sens A.G. (2003) p.45
[17] Jones, Seth G. (2003) p.148
[18] *Ibid*
[19] *Ibid*, p.151
[20] French President Jacques Chirac had described, during a visit to London, France´s relationship with the UK as a typical story of "*un amour violent*", taking into consideration both countries' "fierce competition" and political closeness - "Chirac insists the *entente* is still cordial" *in* The Guardian, 18th November 2004.

The European Security Strategy- Means to an end?

"Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe (…) Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the EU and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations"[21]

Taking a cue from Thomas Diez, when he makes reference to the fact that "foreign policy is itself interwoven with the discourse of a European identity"[22], it is important to analyse the political significance of the so-called "Solana Document" for the dual process of proto-cultural othering and identity formation within inclusive EU states. If security is a practice, "a specific way to frame an issue"[23], then it is no coincidence that the European political intelligentsia felt the need to produce and give empirical content to its first intemporal "speech act" on the organisation and legitimisation of organised violence[24]. That the international context surrounding the ESS was dominated by the war in Iraq was less a nuisance than a convenience to the different authors involved. Conversely, the first working draft of the European Security Strategy was presented in Thessaloniki on June 2003, in parallel with the signing of the accession treaties of the ten new EU members that were expected to fully join the Union in spring 2004. This particular fact is ever more momentous since it juxtaposed both temporal and geopolitical othering processes. It pinpointed threats both beyond and within the borders of the polity i.e. terrorism and religious extremism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime. Concrete spatial references are made, the former threats associated with Middle Eastern states, the latter with the Balkans[25]. The competition between Europe's Other as a geographical state-entity-movement and Europe's own Hobbesian past – the one that should not be allowed to become its future, as in the wise words of Ole Waever[26] - as definitional moments of foreign policy orientation became strikingly acute. A Kantian culture of perpetual peace thus remain a possibility providing that the Other continues to be Europe's own past, while the polities further away from the EU nucleus are not defined as "anti-Europe", only as "less Europe"[27].

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[21] European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels (2003) pp.7-8
[22] Diez, Thomas, "Europe's Others and the Return of Geopolitics", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 17, No.2 (2004) p.331
[23] Waever, Ole *in* Adler, Emanuel, Barnett, Michael (1998) p.80
[24] See Wendt, Alexander (1999)
[25] European Security Strategy (2003) pp.3-4
[26] Waever, Ole *in* Adler, Emanuel, Barnett, Michael (1998) p.90
[27] *Ibid* p.100

The March 11 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid contributed for a refocusing over the inner/outer dichotomy of othering. While during the forty-eight hours post 11-M the dominant threat perceptions stemmed from ETA, a terrorist group rooted within the attacked nation, it soon became clear that the responsibles were in fact an "other" with both inner and outer causation properties. Indeed, the "enemy" was a threefold hybrid – political, social, cultural - , that is to say, it belonged, at the same time, to Spain, to the EU, to a blurry international fundamentalist sect and ultimately, to Madrid. The internalisation of the "conflict" was even more apparent as one could see and hear Jack Straw – the British Foreign Minister – speaking in front of No.10 Downing Street just a few hours after the attack, pledging his – and Europe's – solidarity and assistance to Ana Palacio, the Spanish Foreign Minister. That the message was conveyed directly from a high political officer to another, in an EU framework, speaks volumes on the socialisation of the *elites* in the contemporary process of constructing identity and interests within Brussels. It was not just an attack against Spain, it was a blow struck against Europe, maybe even "Europeaness". The fact that some of the EU heads of government and high dignitaries toyed with the idea of having Madrid hosting the signature of the new Constitutional Treaty instead of Rome further signalled the growing consciousness of the collective threat "imagery" that was to become associated with 11-M.
So one could say that the road from Srebrenica in 1995 to Madrid in 2004, although running in different analogous lanes, contributed to the internalisation of common norms and values to such a degree that, nowadays, "the security of others is not only viewed as related to [Europe's] own, but as literally being our own"[28]. Common external action in a commonly "experienced" socio-political community will, most probably, beg for gradual supranational institutionalisation.

On Effective Multilateralism

"In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our *objective."*[29]

The wording is far from accidental. The emphasis on superseding structuring i.e. the projection of an "international society" based upon co-optable actors and institutions demands a re-centralisation on heterogeneity. By the same token, adapting EU-CFSP to a multi-layered

[28] Jones, Seth G. (2003) p.152
[29] European Security Strategy (2003) p.9

"international order" requires a gradual solid commitment on unitary action via the already mentioned amalgamated web of pluri-directional "wills". Transforming the context of international politics might mean to institutionalise those same dispositions. Consequently, the new Treaty of Rome – unambiguously provides the necessary phraseology that both enables and mandates the EU as a juridical body to "define and *implement* a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy."[30] A post-modern, post-sovereign Europe[31] does not necessarily mean the establishment of a *teflon* global polity exempt of experiencing a roll back process due to severe external and/or internal shocks. However, it might prove to be the seed for a new communal/political organisation, the so-called "World State" that Alexander Wendt makes reference to in a contemporary text. For the latter to happen, the author envisages decision-making processes that would involve "broad based deliberation in a strong public sphere rather than commanded by one person (..) [It should possess] common power, legitimacy, sovereignty and subjectivity (…) [with] the EU not far from meeting these requirements on a regional level."[32] Wendt's quest for multilateral answers on the construction of a representative world polity goes beyond traditional parochial assumptions, its use of teleology being a case in point. The ESS can prove to be a step forward in the creation of a new "epistemic invention"[33] aggregated to distinct supranational political forms.

Towards a Kantian culture of anarchy[34]? Or the new logic of the "security market"

If the structure of international politics has "construction effects on states"[35]**,** then it might follow that both identities and interests are also socially constructed. When resistance to collective identity formation suddenly becomes a problem, issues of state "self-esteem" might come to the fore. If I am allowed a rather parochial but hopefully efficient analogy – in order to put forward an alternative regimental hypothesis for the ESS – one could make a comparison between the "international security market" and the Eurovision song contest. Driving the socialisation of the different actors present in the "market", the EU disposes of different institutional and astitutional tools – an example of the former would be the European Commission, the ESS representing the latter – to either deepen the socio-political commitments of its long-time members, or to co-opt newcomer states. The aforementioned global "security market" has been running its course since the inception of the European Steel

[30]Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Article I-12 (4.), *Official Journal of the European Union*, Brussels, (Dec.2004)
[31] See Diez, Thomas (2004), Waever, Ole (1998)
[32] Wendt, Alexander (2003) p.24
[33] Waever, Ole (1998) p.103
[34] Wendt, Alexander (1999)

and Coal Community – or if one wants to be more precise, since at least Westphalia – yet the pleonastic "winners" within the European context have been the same, at variable levels and different times – France, Germany, the UK and the odd neutral Scandinavian country.

Today, both the global and the regional "market" have expanded, the latter now accommodating its newest competitors from the Eastern and local Southeastern lands. Acknowledging that "collective self-esteem" and a sense of "we*ness*" begs for sharing the podium with the newcoming polities, the traditional champions choose – in very specific political contexts – to make way for the former. Hence one could recently observe that during November´s 2004 contention between the two opposing political sides in Ukraine, the Kiev roundtable had, representing the EU, both the Polish and Lithuanian President's, respectively Aleksander Kwasniewski and Valdas Adamkus. Javier Solana, the High-Representative for the CFSP was of course a very important actor in the negotiations between the warring Ukrainian parties, but he was a "given" i.e. a "judge" whose presence was so natural as to be a non-event. In the end, and encouraged by the positive international outroar stemming from media and political analysts in general, the minnow Lithuanians had had their moment of "glory" on the arena of global politics, just as much as Estonians, Turkish and even Israelis have recently guaranteed unexpected victories at one of the most successful events of European popular culture – the Eurovision song contest. The European project begins to assume an existential quality to it[36], and with it, the constitutive processes of EU foreign policymaking become a substantial part of the whole.

Conclusively, are we in the presence of a "new international political culture (…) in which non-violence and *team play* are the norm?"[37] Does the EU embody such predicaments? Is the ESS – through its commitment on multilateral engagement with both inner and outer Others in the respect of the UN charter – a means to achieve something beyond a "continuum of stateness?"[38] If cultures are shared ideas which help shape state interests and *capabilities*, then the construction of a significant – and essentially supranational – EU polity might contribute to the abridgement of conspicuous self-interest Lockean rivalries. The "logic" of friendship may smack of state anthropomorphism a step too far, but it might be necessary to start re-thinking the semantics of given political science in order to conceive a multiple international order. Having collective security depending on "shared knowledge of each other's peaceful intentions"[39] may be a result of a coherent process of social and political internalisation of the

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[35] *Ibid*, p.248
[36] Dannreuther, Roland (ed.), "Setting the Framework" *in European Union Foreign and Security Policy – Towards a neighbourhood strategy*, Routledge, London (2004) pp.1-2
[37] Wendt, Alexander (1999) p.297
[38] *Ibid*, p.308
[39] *Ibid*, p.299

ESS and its projected norms and values. Either as a "strategy" for obtaining "benefits for themselves [states]" or via an acceptance of the "*legitimate*" factor – meaning that states will not only construct *collective* self-interests but also engage on "other help and altruistic behaviour – the bottom line may be *un resèrrement des rangs* based on the creation of a peaceful "cognitive region" that includes both Self and Other[40].

The problematique pertaining to the way forward thus remains. Will one witness a "World State" conscious of itself, and so "increasingly able to participate as an agent in its own development?"[41] Can the EU be a trailblazer for the emergence of such identity, contributing with its own experience in the exercise of "contained" supranationality? Or, on the other hand, are we walking toward a regional, *or maybe* global exercise on geopolitical othering that might in the end fulfil Robert Kagan´s prophecy on "paradise" *needing* "power", even when regional/international norms dominate foreign policy. All things being equal, an EU supranational foreign policy might prove to be both less "antagonistic" and proner to the formation of a cognitive area of collective legitimacy at a regional level.[42]

[40] See Wendt, Alexander (1999) pp.304-308
[41] Wendt, Alexander (2003) p.60
[42] See Diez, Thomas (2004) pp.330-333

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