

The Cases of Turkey and Ukraine and the new Frontiers of the European Geopolitical Space

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The purpose of the Report is to study the relations between the internal political process in Turkey and in Ukraine as well as the external political orientation of both countries towards the EU. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the opening of the negotiations for Turkey's joining the EU are events placing the debate regarding the European geopolitical space frontiers within a new framework. Having gone on the other side of the Bosphorus, the EU will be not only an economic and cultural alliance but will also become a distinctly defined independent geopolitical unit. Being geographically a bridge between two continents Turkey provides the EU with a direct access at the Middle East. Through Ukraine, the EU may enter deep into the Eurasian continental space.

Key words:

- European integration
- EU Enlargement
- Turkey
- Ukraine
- Geopolitics

The forthcoming admission of Bulgaria and Rumania to the European Union will look like stopping at a minor railway station if in the course of the next 15-20 years the train of the Euro-enlargement would also reach Turkey. In 2005 event of utmost importance for the future of Europe took place – the negotiations with Turkey for its full membership in the EU were opened. Thus, 42 years after Turkey had signed the association agreement with the EU and 17 years after that country had entered its application for a full membership, Turkey at last stepped on track of the Euro-integration and only wonder might ever derail it.

The three main arguments against the eventual Turkish membership can be expressed through these three adjectives: big, poor and Muslim. In ten years Turkey will be bigger than Germany – the country with the biggest population among the EU members. Apart of that, the gross domestic product per capita in Turkey is much smaller than that of the poorest present EU member.

As, apart of everything else, the European Union is also a gigantic re-distributive body concerned with re-directing funds from the rich to the poor regions of its member countries, Turkey will be entitled to enormous amounts of money from the joint European treasury. According to certain assessments the subsidies to be received by Ankara for agriculture only will amount to 11.3 billions Euro per year. Having in mind that the contemporary European cultural identity is Christian in its origin, an argument of no lesser importance against Turkey's full membership in the EU is the religion of its people. However, none of the arguments against Turkey's membership in the EU is undefeatable. Turkey is a really big country but there is no ground for fears that its population will keep on growing with rates typical for the Third World. Following a most realistically sounding forecast, made by the Institute of Population Researches at the Hadjettepe University, the population of Turkey shall never reach 100 million people, its number will grow till 2030-2035 by which time it will reach a stable 93-94 million people, and then it will begin to decrease. In the period 1980-2000 the annual rate of increase in the population of Turkey has gone down from 2,29% to 1.49%¹. Today the Europeans have misgivings caused by the fear of an eventual demographic boom in Turkey but in time the things might so turn that a big part of their retirement income would be covered by the deductions from the salaries of the Turkish population of employment age.

As far as poverty is concerned, it is not an insurmountable problem too. Though it will never reach the life standard of Belgium or the Netherlands, Turkey is one of the few (and quite possibly just the only one) example of successful industrial culture development in a Muslim country. In 2004 half of the TV sets sold in the EU were produced in Turkey. Taking into consideration the already established labour ethics and rational model of individual economic behavior, the Turkish economy can be expected to develop even faster, should it become a part of the large European Union market. As all forecasts show in the next 2-3 decades the annual economic growth of Turkey will be at least twice that of the EU. The main problem the Turkish government is faced with, though, is to find a way to extend the economic boom geographically so that it will not remain confined within the western part of the country. From social and economic point of view there are two or even three different Turkey-s in existence today. The first, highly developed and comparatively rich one includes the megalopolises of Istanbul and Ankara and the adjoining zones. The second one is very poor and underdeveloped in the Oriental way. It is in the eastern part of the country. A third, intermediate, Turkey has started to emerge recently; its centre is the town of Kayseri. It is getting industrialized very quickly and is already turning its back to the Oriental poverty². Referring to the drastic regional discrepancies in the country, German former foreign minister Joschka Fischer remarked that "Turkey's EU compatibility is put on the test in Diyarbakir and Erzurum, not in Izmir and Istanbul"³.

Turkey is a country with a very large agrarian sector but by the date of its admittance the rather costly EU agriculture policy is expected to have been reformed and the subsidies for the agricultural producers to have been significantly reduced.

Probably, Turkey's religious and cultural differences present the most serious problem. Even the most politically correct authors are obliged to admit that the European culture is based on the Judeo-Christian traditions and that for long historical periods it actually kept establishing its image and identity in confrontation with the Islam world. Here it must be pointed out that Turkey is first of all a secular state. It is a Muslim country but not an Islamic one. It would be hypocrisy to pretend that because of its Muslim population Turkey has no place in the EU, since 15,5 million Muslims live in the EU countries now, its number keeps on constantly increasing and nobody there is intending to chase those people away⁴. Exaggerated are also the fears that Turkey's eventual membership in the EU will open the way to a new inflow of Turkish immigrants who would like to stay permanently in West Europe. The demographic researches predict that within the whole period ending with the year 2030 just 1,3 to 2,7 million people would migrate from Turkey to the present countries – EU members⁵.

Turkish candidacy for EU membership seems rather unusual because there are several paradoxes related to it. The first one is historical. In the 16-17 centuries the mighty Ottoman Empire failed in its attempts to seize the Vienna castle and thus to firmly install itself in Central Europe. Today, Turkey, which is successor of the Ottoman Empire, might be able to conquer the fortress "Europe" not with arms but by means of negotiations for joining the EU. If in the 14th century and a long time afterwards the Turkish sultans succeeded in letting Asia in Europe, now the reverse is going to happen – by involving Turkey in the Euro-integration discourse, Europe is going to penetrate deeply in Asia.

Another paradox is related to the evolution of the Turkish inner policy model. What gave birth to present-day Turkey was an aspiration for Europeanization. Nowadays, the imperatives of the Euro-integration are turning void a part of the Ataturk's political heritage. For example, the part assigned to the military as protectors of the contemporary political system in Turkey. Thus from a semi-military orchestrated democracy the country evolved into a society of a model similar to the West-European one. From 2004 on the Secretary of the powerful Turkish Council of national Security is not military but a civilian. Turkey is facing the most serious change in its political system from the times of Ataturk to this day. The core of this change is the change of the safeguard that guarantees the country its continuous modernization and the preservation of the secularity of its state. Till now that part belonged to the military but from now on the European Union is going to take it. The interiorization of an external in its origin factor (the EU) in the interior political life of the country is what will make it possible. Part of the subconscious fears Europeans suffer in relation to the Turkish membership in the EU come actually from the insecurity that the European Union will be able to accomplish such an extraordinary task. In the course of the pre-accession negotiations Turkey will gradually and nearly imperceptibly find itself caught in the net of Copenhagen criteria, revision chapters, directives, programs, projects and resolutions and a range of other products of the Brussels-Strasbourg bureaucracy. They all will irrevocably limit the possibility for political interference on the part of the military.

EU is a secular community but the Turkish secular parties created on European lines were unable to put Turkey on the road leading toward Euro-integration. A party with Islamic roots, however, successfully achieved that. One cannot be sure though whether the former Islamists from the Justice and Development Party or AKP (as it is known by its Turkish abbreviation) are not just using the Euro-integration argument as a pretense to alienate the militaries from politics. Even if that were their main purpose, it does not change the result – the Turkish political system comes gradually closer to the European. At the end of January 2005 AKP was given the statute of observer in the European People's Party. Thus the "Islamist" Erdogan found himself a member of the European family, part of which are the German Christian-democrats⁶. By the way, Erdogan himself has always emphasized that he is not a supporter of the "Muslim" but of the "conservative" democracy. Coincidentally, he shows good skill in using the "Europe" argument to calm down the impatience of AKP's most radical supporters.

They are explained that only Europe has the capability to build institutional boundaries around the military and to protect Turkish democracy⁷.

The most typical trait of Turkey is not its large population, its poverty or its Muslim religion but the coexistence of these three factors with its enormous inner dynamics. According to a research of the UN, Turkey holds the first place in world in regard of its citizens' migration within their own country⁸. There are in Turkey extensive economic, social and cultural disparities, the crossing point of which keeps on changing all the time. That is why the issue of admitting Turkey in the EU is transposable to the issue of what extent of dynamics a comparatively static political system like the European Union would sustain. The 2004 extension of the European Union with 10 new members is often defined as the Big Bang. The actual Big Bang, however, will come at the moment when Turkey will become a member of the EU. The lengthy pre-accession negotiations between Brussels and Ankara ought to keep this explosion under control so that it shall not destroy the whole European structure.

Till the autumn of 2004 political scientists visualized Ukraine in the light of the already classical theses of two of the best contemporary analyzers – Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington. The first one claimed that without control over Ukraine Russia had no chance to be reborn as an empire. The latter situated one of the division lines, separating the West Christian civilization from the Orthodox Christian civilization, in the middle of Ukraine. The events of the end of 2004 in Kiev, which entered history as the “Orange Revolution”, reconfirmed as the claim of Brzezinski as well as that of Huntington, but they also added many new traits through which the geo-political face of Ukraine emerged clearer.

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine can be explained with a theory considering the different patterns of political legacy which the ex-Soviet republics have adopted. In most general terms they could be classified in three groups. The first group is composed by the three Baltic republics, which after the dissolution of the USSR have had an easy transition toward the classical Western democracy with no problems whatsoever. Under such democratic system the authority is presumably passed from one party to another by means of free and fair elections. The second political pattern legacy could be defined as Byelorussian - Mid-Asian pattern. In this case the President's office is for life and only as a last resort the authority might be passed into the hands of another member of the ruling family. The third pattern is the Russian one. In this case the president, vacating the post, nominates his successor, who is expected to keep the status quo basically unchanged. An exception to this explanatory disposition remains the Revolution of the Roses, which in 2003 swept away the rule of Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia. Mikhail Saakashvili presented his activities as a drastic break-up from the Russian and Byelorussian – Mid-Asian patterns of political legacy and adoption the Baltic one.

Where is the place of Ukraine in this diagram? The outset of the Kyiv conflict was in the late spring of 2004, when under the strong pressure of the West, Leonid Kuchma decided not to run for a third term of presidency, though according to a rather dubious interpretation of the Constitution of the country, he formally had the right to do so. What actually happened was that the head of state rejected the Byelorussian - Mid-Asian model of authority succession as inapplicable in the Ukrainian conditions and decided to resort to the Russian one. As a successor who was to guarantee the freedom and the personal property and wealth of the Kuchma family, they chose Victor Yanukovych – a high-ranking bureaucrat with good managerial abilities but fully devoid of politician's personal charm. That choice made quite transparent Kuchma's ambition to keep on being an important factor in the Ukrainian political life even after his withdrawal from presidency. The idea was to change the state and legal system of Ukraine in such a way that a part of the really significant power held by the president at that time should pass under the control of the government and the parliament. In such a case Kuchma would have had the chance to hold an important post either as a prime-minister or as a kind of arbitrator among the various authorities, unavoidably expected to get into rivalry with each other.

The drama started in November 2004, when it became clear that all the conditions, necessary for the Georgian model of change of rule under the pressure of the street, were present in Ukraine⁹. The confrontation between Victor Yanukovych and Victor Yushchenko developed along several existing parallel lines. The two leaders personified the yearnings of the two main ethnic and cultural groups of the Ukrainian population. The supporters of Yanukovych were Russian speaking people (but not necessarily Russians¹⁰), Orthodox Christians, people, feeling nostalgic for the Soviet Union. Yushchenko was supported by Ukrainian speaking people, Uniates¹¹, circles with pro-Western leanings, whose national heroes were Bohdan Hmelnytsky, Stepan Bandera and Viacheslav Chornovil. A fact speaking for itself was the TV debate at the eve of the second election round; at it Yushchenko was speaking in Ukrainian while Yanukovych was answering him in Russian. But the most convincing evidence for the division of Ukraine in two nearly equal halves (the line of division is not actually the Dnepr River as many people believe it to be) is probably the electoral map of the country. At the election round replay on 26th December 2004 the Herson district is the only place where the difference between Yushchenko and Yanukovych was only several percent. Everywhere else one of them had twice the number of votes of his respective rival¹². The elections in Ukraine were a confrontation of two political cultures. The Eastern part of the country adopted the Russian model of authority succession while the Western part was closer to the Baltic model but had no scruples to impose it in the Georgian way. Expressed through toponyms, the conflict was Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk versus Lvov and Kyiv.

The other line of confrontation between the two candidates for president was geo-economic. Yanukovych represented the interests of the highly industrialized East Ukraine, whose economic base is mining, metallurgy, steelworks and machine building. These branches of industry remained unreformed and kept on working in the Soviet way with enormous waste of energy, cheap raw materials, and comparatively skilled hereditary workers for many generations. Yushchenko came from banking circles and stood closer to the capital that turns round in the scopes of the finances, services and the light industry to a certain degree. The matters being so, it is clear why the economic power behind the state supported candidate was far bigger than that of the opposition candidate-supporting group. According to some rough calculations the ratio between the GDP of the Yanukovych Ukraine and the GDP of Yushchenko Ukraine is 70 to 30. By this reason some people described the Orange Revolution as a “revolt of the millionaires against the billionaires”. But the Ukrainian billionaires are not private dealers of the usual type. Their business is directly connected with the authorities through privatization deals, license regulations, tax breaks and tacit immunity from legal prosecution. At a sharp turn of the state rule many of the oligarchs of Donetsk or Dnepropetrovsk were to fall over the board of the pretended economical prosperity. Therefore, the pressure of the street used to change of authority in Kiev could be also defined as an anti-oligarchic revolution. The economic and administrative privileges of the pro-Russian camp were neutralized by the stronger political energy of the opposition. Another important factor for Yushchenko’s success was the control over Kyiv. If the capital of Ukraine had been in the East part of the country, the events would have evolved in a completely different way.

The transfer of power in Kyiv was much slower and more painful than that in Tbilisi because in Ukraine there was practically no “electoral pond” – voters always supporting the winner. The enormous majority of the East Ukrainian population never acknowledged Yushchenko as their new national leader. At the most crucial moment, when the political confrontation had reached its peak, it turned out that the state bodies in Kyiv might play the part of such “pond”. At the pressure of thousands of demonstrators the members of the Parliament and the judges of the Supreme Court of Ukraine were made to realize that the political pendulum was changing its swing and that those who would not change their political orientation in good time might be in trouble. The revolution of the streets turned into a revolution of the

establishments and the state legislative bodies of the country countermanded the preliminary announced victory of Yanukovych.

Yushchenko's camp demonstrated a very good sense of political strategy and in spite of its heterogeneity succeeded in preserving its unity to the end of the Orange Revolution. The most important technological point for a "velvet" revolution is to never, not even for a moment, relieve the street pressure exerted on the authorities. It would be very difficult to restore the momentum of the protest after it has once been lost or weakened. If it happened the ruling group state administration would prevail. These fine technological points were demonstrated at Milosevic's deposition in Yugoslavia (in 2000) and Shevardnadze's – in Georgia.

Therefore, the Orange Revolution leaders had at their disposal already tried examples to follow.

Actually, in such a case the main skill required is to be able to preserve that exceptionally high level of political opposition's mobilization, which is good enough to keep enormous crowds of people at the central square of the capital. In Kyiv that task was made even more difficult by the unfavorable meteorological conditions since the Orange Revolution began early in the winter. The process of organization, stabilization and preservation of the "revolutionary identity" in the Ukraine shall find its place in the books of political science. What is meant in this case is the successful unification of several different lines of protest into a united political movement, capable of decisive actions. According to the Ukrainian analyst Zherebkin the Orange Revolution leaders managed by the end of 2004 to bring the political struggle to the simplest bipolar confrontation – "authorities versus people" in which case three main ideological groups – nationalists, socialists and liberal-democrats, identified themselves with the "people". At the same time the representatives of the state authority were demonized and signs of equality were put between the leaving president Leonid Kuchma, Victor Yanukovych and his government, the Central Election Committee and the oligarchs, supporting Yanukovych¹³. In our opinion the radicalization of the political confrontation and cleaning it from any half-tones, helped the opposition to keep its unity and to win in the end. When after the first ballot round President Kuchma tried to play the part of a conciliator, Yushchenko and Timoshenko immediately parried that possibility. They declared that no centrist political position was in existence at the moment, and, therefore, any pretence to adopt such is pointless. Kuchma's political curtsies to the opposition were unambiguously interpreted not as peace offering but as political impotence. That was the turning point after which ministers of state, governors, Supreme Court judges and members of Parliament started changing sides and offering their support to Yushchenko, thus setting the snowball effect into motion.

Though being only a part of the technology of the political change, the symbols and staging of the Orange Revolution are worth special attention. The street protests had their martyr (Victor Yushchenko with his poison damaged face) and their sex symbol (Yulia Tymoshenko). The symbols of the Orange printed on banners, headscarves, sweatshirts and neckties were both - impressive and mobilizing. The thing that attracted thousands of traditionally apolitical young people to the Independence Square was actually the romantic halo enveloping the protests. Regardless of the impressive showiness of the Orange Revolution it will be exaggeration to insist that in Kyiv a radical change in the political system took place. According to George Soros, a "transformation from rapacious to legitimate capitalism" is now taking place in Ukraine. No one, however, can guarantee that the new rulers in Kyiv will not get enmeshed in clientelism and non-transparent privatization transactions and that finally the business will not again get interwoven with the state administration as it happened before. At the same time it is clear that the presidency is no more functioning in the same way it did in Kuchma's time, when the institution of the head of state was very much like a black hole of enormous gravity, irresistibly attracting and absorbing all resources of authority in the country. In the first months after Yushchenko's coming into power the government established itself as an independent centre of political influence (till the dismissal of the Prime-Minister Tymoshenko

in September 2005). Later on it proved that the President is not able to control the Parliament too. The judiciary system was also freed from administrative pressure, which does not necessarily mean that it has become independent, since it keeps growing extremely corrupt¹⁴. As it is typical for a country with weak administrative infrastructure, in Ukraine many of the disputes never reach a court of law but are settled in ways not legally stipulated. After the Orange Revolution Ukraine's ever getting back within the Russian scope of influence seems rather improbable. Even if the bigger part of the ex-elite survives, the important geopolitical change is the way in which the state authority defines its identity and legitimacy. Things with Yanukovich were clear – he asked for power with three main slogans: declaring Russian as one of the official languages, permitting double citizenship and Ukraine's declaration of its rejection of future membership in NATO. Yushchenko's political platform was the exact opposite – applying for membership in NATO and the European Union and emancipation from Moscow on the ground of relations of equal partnership. In view of all said, similarly to Turkey, the fate of the Ukrainian project for integration with the West and the European Union in particular will be decided by the East part of the country. The citizens of East Ukraine have to be convinced that Kyiv's strong desire for entering NATO and the EU shall by no means put them in contradiction with their feeling of loyalty to Russia.

Days only after Yushchenko's victory at the replay ballot the European Parliament adopted with overwhelming majority of 467 to 19 votes an open resolution, appealing to offer Ukraine a "definite European prospect with a possibility that it will lead to its membership in the EU¹⁵". Though Ukraine will not soon be granted the statute of a country in accession negotiations with the EU, it is already on its way to move from the post-Soviet into the European geo-political space. As a matter of fact, not the formal procedures required for the admission of Turkey and Ukraine to the EU, but the democratization of their political systems, interpreted as Europeanization of the same, is the factor, contributing to the extension of the European geo-political space. It is remarkable that together with the change of personalities that occurred in the political power of Ukraine in 2004, it was also agreed to reduce the President's authority and to increase of the role of the Parliament. Thus Ukraine has renounced the model of the USA and the ex-Soviet republics which gives the president great power, and is coming closer to the parliamentary democracy characteristic for the EU. The changes in Ankara and Kyiv are of great importance for the fate of Europe because, excluding Russia, there is no country at the old Continent wider than Turkey or Ukraine. Rapprochement with Ukraine will be EU's first geo-political break through into the post-Soviet territory from which Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are indigenously excluded. The engagement with Turkey will necessarily impose changes in the EU's identity. The 10 new members, admitted in 2004 were comparatively easily assimilated because they were neither too big nor too different. Turkey, however, cannot be assimilated. It can only be integrated with all the resulting consequences, and this will by all means reflect on the overall countenance of the EU.

Through Turkey which from geographical point of view is a country-bridge, connecting two continents, EU will have a direct access to the Middle-East political scene. Through Ukraine, on the other hand, a deep penetration into the mainland will be achieved. Afterwards, the European Union should not be defined as a Rimland (following Halford Makinder terminology - an inner crescent encircling the Heartland). Now, to the Brzezinski prognosis that Moscow cannot be an empire without Ukraine, we can add something - Moscow was and to a great extent still is an independent geo-political pole precisely because of the empire idea. After the Orange Revolution the possibility of Russia's losing its position as a geopolitical magnet and its eventual incorporation into Europe is to be considered. It is just like a game of tug-of-war: pulling one important player (Ukraine) over the dividing line to the other side might end with pulling the leader of the team (Russia) in the same direction too.

The question however is whether the world's leader, USA, will allow such extensive geo-political expansion of Europe. Would the USA not prefer to have their say prevail in Kyiv and Ankara to that of Brussels? After September 11th the Americans have undergone a serious evolution in defining their international priorities. The battle for world domination has been transferred in the Muslim part of Asia, and the USA would rather have the EU as an ally than impair its unity and obstruct its expansion. As far as Turkey is concerned, Washington would very much like to be able to make use of the important military airbase Injirlik. That can be achieved only if the Ataturk's homeland is a secular, stable and predictable state. The involvement of Turkey in the Euro-integration process as a means for accomplishing this purpose is welcome to the USA. That was why the Americans exerted strong pressure on the EU to make it open the pre-accession talks with Ankara. Such a sequence of events will be a guarantee for the USA that there will be somebody else to tame the political demons of a dangerously kaleidoscopic and dynamic country which Turkey is. Thus the USA shall have one thing less to worry about.

The Americans should not object any European penetration in Ukraine too as it will further the accomplishment of a long- term target of theirs – tearing Ukraine away from the Russian orbit. By the way, the Ukrainian crisis of the end of 2004 was the first case in which Europe intervened more actively than the USA in a problem ex-Soviet republic.

Such is the picture of interaction among the three main geo-political poles on which the fates of Ukraine and Turkey depend, and it should be assumed that the integration process of these two countries in the European domain would follow a successful though long and uneven path.

¹ Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (BTA), Emission "Balkan News", 12.10.2004

² The businessmen of Kayseri are defined in the scientific literature as the "The Islamic Calvinists". The best research of this phenomenon is to be found in: Islamic Calvinists. Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia. European Stability Initiative. Berlin-Istanbul, 19.09.2005.
http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=69

³ Joschka Fischer. Turkey's European Perspective: The German View. Turkish Policy Quarterly Vol. 3, No. 3 (Fall 2004). <http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=122>

⁴ Timothy M. Savage. Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing. The Washington Quarterly - Volume 27, Number 3, Summer 2004, pp. 25-50

⁵ Refik Erzan and Kemal Kirisci. Turkish Immigration, Their Integration In The EU And Immigration Into Turkey. Turkish Policy Quarterly Vol. 3, No. 3 (Fall 2004). <http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=122>

⁶ <http://www.epp-eu.org/memberparties.php>

⁷ Vali Nasr. The Rise of "Muslim Democracy". Journal of Democracy, Volume 16, №2, April 2005, pp.13-27.

⁸ BTA, Emission "Balkan News", 11.11. 2004

⁹ When summarizing the case of democratic breakthroughs in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, McFaul enumerates seven main factors for successful deposition of an "old regime": 1. a semi-autocratic rather than fully autocratic regime; 2. an unpopular incumbent; 3. a united and organized opposition; 4. an ability quickly to drive home the point that voting results were falsified; 5. enough independent media to inform the citizens about the falsified vote; 6. a political opposition capable to mobilizing tens of thousands or more demonstrators, and 7. divisions among the regime's coercive forces. Michael McFaul. Transitions from postcommunism. Journal of Democracy, Volume 16, №3, July 2005, pp. 5-19. These factors were actually present in Ukraine but a distinction should be made between the first two factors which are political and substantial from the remaining five which are concerned with the political technology.

¹⁰ According to the official census of 2001 in all the districts of East Ukraine the Ukrainians are more than the Russians.

http://www.ng.ru/cis/2004-12-03/1_ukraine.html

¹¹ The confessional division of Ukraine is rather complicated. The largest religious community is orthodox and belongs to the Orthodox Church subordinated to the Russian Patriarch. The orthodox community belonging to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church that broke away from Moscow in 1992 is about one half of the former. The Uniates who are orthodox by rituals and observance but acknowledge the supremacy of the Pope in Rome from

the 16th century on, are several millions Another religious community is that of the Roman Catholics. The Orthodox Church subordinated to the Moscow Patriarch supported Yanukovych, while the other three supported Yushchenko who is orthodox by religion. See: <http://www.inosmi.ru/translation/216246.html>

¹² http://www.mignews.com/news/politic/cis/281204_102531_62124.html

¹³ Maksym Zherebkin. Mobilizing Political Support during the "Orange Revolution": The Constitutive Role of Ideological Practices. CEU Political Science Journal, January 2006.

<http://www.personal.ceu.hu/PolSciJournal/issues.html>

¹⁴ Grani plus. 17.02.2006,

<http://www.grani.kiev.ua/exp.php?ni=8009&type=1&PHPSESSID=d7e0a0c4372c7d9f71efb6dd6a0b640>

¹⁵ <http://www.euobserver.com/?sid=9&aid=18135>

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